On Free Will and the Law by Peter Martyr Vermigli

Summary/Review

On Free Will and the Law by Peter Martyr Vermigli

On Free Will and the Law is the second volume in the Davenant Institute's new translation of Vermigli's 'Common Places', or Loci Communes. The essence of the book is concerned with the question of to what extent human will is 'free' after the fall and before the new creation. Vermigli's definition of Free Will is given in the first chapter:

The will is free when it embraces, as it likes, those decisions which are approved by the cognitive part of the mind. Thus, the nature of free will, while most evident in volition, has its roots in reason.⁸

And later:

I define free will as follows: It is the faculty by which we either espouse or reject, as we like, those decisions that have been made by reason.⁹

However, throughout the work, the way that freedom and free will is discussed makes it unclear exactly if we can say that the will is free. On my reflection of what Vermigli discusses, we can say that after the fall, people who have not been reborn by the Holy Spirit are free in the sense that they are able to do what they want, however they are not free in the sense that they can want to do anything other than sin.

People who have been reborn by the Holy Spirit now have, by God's grace, the ability to want to do things which please him. However, due to original sin, they are unable to do these things without God's help.

Regarding the first creation and the new creation, in the first creation Adam was free to either sin or remain in grace, however in the new creation God's people will not want to do anything other than what pleases God.

The Four States of Humanity

Vermigli, in his discussion of the will, distinguishes between the four states of man which, while found in scripture, are clearly presented by Augustine in his Enchiridion¹. These are:

1. Creation: As Adam was created in the beginning.

2. Fall: After Adam fell, which is 'the current state of his entire progeny'¹⁶.

3. After Christ's ascension: Those who have been reborn in Christ.

4. The New Creation: When we have put off our mortal body.

Three spheres of action

Vermigli distinguishes also between three arenas or spheres where human action is concerned. Each can be understood both before and after the fall:

Natural actions: being sick, being healthy, being nourished etc

Before the fall, these were subject to a kind of necessity, as humans would still have to eat, but were blessed compared to the current state of humanity.

After the fall, we are subject to much more necessity here, due to sickness, disease, and death.

Civil or moral actions: concerned with doing just or unjust things

Before the fall, Adam was free regarding these actions, being able to do what his will desired. God gave Adam grace to continue in obedience. However, in his freedom Adam could relinquish this grace if he wished.

After the fall, we continue to have a degree of freedom about these actions, 'as these fall within natural knowledge and do not exceed the powers of our will'.² However, of these actions, their outcome is in the hands of God. Vermigli references Jeremiah 10:23, Ezekiel 21:20-21, Romans 1:10 and Psalm 127:1 on this point.

Actions that are pleasing and gratifying to God

Before the fall, Adam was also free to please God, for God had given him grace to be able to do this. However, this grace did not extend to preventing Adam from falling away if Adam wished. This contrasts with our grace in Christ. Referencing Augustine, Vermigli states that 'the grace that we now possess through Christ [is] above the grace that Adam had in paradise, for now by the grace of Christ we not only persevere, provided we are willing, but, as Paul says, thanks to it, we also possess both the willing and its accomplishment.'³

After the fall, we are not free regarding these actions, and we remain unable to please God. We sin out of necessity. Vermigli states that both reason and will have been left to humans after the fall, but that they have been crippled and wounded by the sin. As knowledge and appetite are required for Godly actions, we cannot really say that humans cannot do anything pleasing to God by themselves. It is only in God drawing us to Christ and healing our knowledge and appetites that we can do what pleases God.

Necessity and Coercion

So, if we sin out of necessity, would this not make God unjust in giving us commands which we are unable to keep? No. As Vermigli states, 'God should not be accused of unfairness on this account, as it is not his fault that his requirements cannot be met.'⁴ There are three reasons why God gave the law:⁵

1. To contribute to civil order.
2. To give us recognition of sin, to be able to assess our weakness and compare this with the greatness of God. It thereby brings us into repentance.
3. To mirror a true life so that Christians can know what fruits they should display.

The reason we cannot fulfil the commands God has given us is because of sin within us, not because God is violently preventing of our wills from doing what it wishes.

Vermigli, citing Ambrose and Augustine, shows that free will can be contrasted with force and coercion, or contrasted to an equal disposition to either direction in a decision.

As for God himself, surely one should not say he does not have free will because he is unable to sin?¹⁰ One and the same Spirit performs everything, distributing to everything as he wishes, according to the discretion of his free will, not in submission to necessity.¹¹

These quotations from Augustine and Ambrose are taking free will in contrast to necessity or coercion. However, Vermigli provides quotations from Jerome and Augustine which contrast free will with an inability to choose between options.

God is the only one whom sin does not and cannot characterise. Everything else, since it has free will, can be turned in either direction.¹² Just as the first immortality, which Adam lost by his sin, was the ability not to die, so the first free will was the ability not to sin, whereas the last will be the inability to sin.¹³

Augustine states that man destroyed both himself and his free will by misusing his free will, for sin won the contest and reduced man to servitude.⁶

Later in the work, Vermigli shows the three ways an action can be with respect to freedom:

1. Free: When two or more options have been proposed that which it is able to choose what it wants according to its pleasure is free.
2. Violent: That which is moved by an outside source and does not itself contribute to that movement, but on the contrary fights against it, is violent.
3. Spontaneous: That which has an inner force and is included towards the motion it is driven in is called spontaneous.

This is where the confusion which I initially discussed is present. Vermigli says that 'this is the reason we flatly deny the will of unregenerate individuals to be free, since it cannot choose the things that have to do with salvation.'⁷ However, because of sin, doesn't the will spontaneously desire sin, and so is free? As free will was initially presented as being able to choose or reject the thing that the mind approves, if the mind approves sin and the will chooses it, doesn't that make the will free?

I think that two responses could be given to this.

The sources of error make us sin

Error comes from two sources:

• The mind, not recognising the just or unjust action to take.
• Desire, lust or concupiscence, turns us away from what we see to be right.¹⁴

I think Vermigli may say that even though our wills are free, because of original sin we cannot help ourselves, and we always choose wrongly. Therefore, we cannot really be said to have a free will due to our slavery to sin.

We can be free in different ways

Vermigli states:

People can be referred to as free as far as concerns either coercion, sin, or misery. The first freedom, from coercion, is given to all people. However, all who have not yet come to Christ are in every way subject to sin and misery.¹⁵

We see therefore, that when Vermigli denies free will to people, it is because they are not free from sin. If Vermigli affirms free will, it is because of our freedom from coercion.

We should show a similar care in determining what we mean by the word freedom in our own discussions of the subject.